Home / Publications / Journals / Nuclear Technology / Volume 54 / Number 3
Nuclear Technology / Volume 54 / Number 3 / September 1981 / Pages 332-341
First International Retran Meeting / Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow / dx.doi.org/10.13182/NT81-A32778
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The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) has performed a thermal-hydraulic analysis of the Crystal River Unit 3 nuclear plant incident that occurred on February 26, 1980. The incident was initiated at 2:23 p.m. by an instrument and control system electrical malfunction that resulted in loss of power on the nonnuclear instrumentation (NNI) “X” bus. This failure caused the loss of several control and indication parameters, including pressurizer and steam generator level, and all reactor coolant system (RCS) temperatures. The loss of control parameters fed erroneous signals to the integrated control system, which in turn initially increased reactor power level, terminated feedwater flow to the steam generators, and opened steam turbine throttle valves to maintain outlet steam conditions. In addition, the power-operated relief valve (PORV) opened prematurely and remained open as a result of faulty circuit design in the NNI. This transient culminated in a reactor trip, turbine trip, and an engineered safeguards actuation, discharging ≈40 000 gal of primary system coolant to the floor of the containment building. The thermal-hydraulic analysis of the above event was performed by NSAC, using the RETRAN computer code. The objectives were as follows: